October 1999

Supreme Court to hear state case | Attorney General issues opinions

Supreme Court to hear state case.

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments Nov. 10 as it considers whether Congress had the constitutional authority to override state open records laws when it enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA).

Five lower federal courts, including the 11th and 4th U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, concluded that Congress violated the 10th Amendment when it enacted the DPPA in 1994. However, three courts, including the 7th and 10th U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, deemed the Act a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.

A decision by the Supreme Court is expected early next year. Congress, however, may not wait for the Court to decide on the validity of the DPPA. A transportation appropriations bill being considered in early September would force states to limit access to driver's license information in exchange for federal highway funds.

Such an approach, though, is not assured of passing constitutional muster, either. The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, while striking down the DPPA, commented that it was "hard pressed" to see a connection between privacy and highway funds.

Still, the DPPA represents a strong belief by some people that the information provided to obtain a driver's license -- address, birth date, Social Security number, photograph, height and weight -- should be kept from public view. Four of the federal courts interpreting the DPPA did not agree, however. In striking down the statute, they said drivers have no reasonable expectation that such motor vehicle record data will be kept secret. Indeed, this is the very sort of information to which individuals do not have a reasonable expectation [of privacy]," wrote the 4th Circuit.

Part of the 1994 Crime Bill, the Driver's Privacy Protection Act was intended to prevent stalkers and anti-abortion protesters from locating people using information obtained from state Department of Motor Vehicle records. Critics of the DPPA have noted that its proponents supplied no statistical evidence to support their argument that such records posed a significant danger.

In effect, the DPPA superseded the law in 42 states where driver's license and vehicle registration information were open records. States were permitted to keep DMV records open only if their legislatures voted to do so and if they allowed drivers the option of keeping "personal" information secret. When the statute took effect in September 1997, legislatures in 31 states had approved an "opt-out" policy, according to a 1997 Quill article.

Although a conflict between opposing social values -- individual privacy and public access to government records -- is at the heart of the Act, only four of the courts to review the statute examined whether a constitutional right of privacy precludes the disclosure of DMV records. Instead, judicial interpretation of the statute centered squarely on whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in violation of the 10th Amendment.

In deciding whether Congress infringed on states' rights when it regulated public access to driver's licenses, the lower courts came to opposing conclusions about whether the DPPA:

Requires states to passively withold records to meet a federal standard or requires states to actively administer an unfunded federal policy;

Affects states as governments or as the owners of data bases of personal information; and

Actually affects interstate commerce in personal information.

The Department of Justice has contended in court that the federal government's power to regulate interstate trade under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution gave Congress the authority to enact the DPPA. However, congressional power under the Commerce Clause is constrained by the 10th Amendment, which reserves to the states the powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government by the Constitution.

Courts upholding the statute found it to be a constitutional, generally applicable law setting a federal standard that simply requires states to passively withhold information. They also agreed with the federal government's contention that the Act constitutionally affected states as owners of databases of personal information, not as governments. In other words, these courts concluded that the DPPA does not affect any unique government function, such as the state legislative process or state law enforcement activities. Rather, it regulates business-related activities in which some states happen to be engaging.

However, courts striking down the Act concluded that it unconstitutionally requires states to actively administer an unfunded federal regulatory program.

The DPPA is not a law of general applicability that incidentally applies to the states, but rather is, as the 4th Circuit said, "a law that, for all intents and purposes, applies only to the States." The Act does not attempt to regulate the disclosure of personal information contained in private databases but instead regulates only the release of such information contained in state DMV records. In essence, the statute unconstitutionally requires states to create and maintain a system to enforce a federal policy.

The 11th Circuit, in striking down the statute, also questioned whether the DPPA actually affects inter-state trafficking in personal information because Congress "riddled the Act with more holes than Swiss cheese" and thus exempted from the DPPA

Attorney General issues opinions

Attorney General Drew Edmondson has recently issued several opinions construing the Oklahoma Open Records Act and the Oklahoma Open Meetings Act.

In A.G. Opinion No. 99-30, issued July 19, 1999, the Attorney General was asked whether the Open Records Act permits a public body to maintain confidentiality of the home telephone numbers of its employees.

With respect to State employees, the Attorney General found that the Legislature has mandated that state employee home telephone numbers are confidential records, pursuant to 74 O.S.Supp.1998, §840-2.11. That statute also requires a State employee's home address and social security number to be kept confidential.

However, the Attorney General found that while public bodies other than the State are required to keep confidential the home addresses of their employees, no similar mandate exists with respect to home telephone numbers. The Attorney General noted, however, that 51 O.S.Supp.1998, §24A.1, permits a public body to keep personnel records confidential "[w]here disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]"

The Attorney General thus held that public bodies other than state agencies may keep the telephone numbers of their employees confidential if disclosure of the telephone numbers would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Attorney General found that determination to be a question of fact outside the scope of an Attorney General Opinion.

ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

A.G. Opinion No. 99-37, also issued July 19, 1999, addressed whether the Association of County Commissioners Self Insurance Fund and the Association of County Commissioners Self Insurance Group are required to comply with the provisions of the Open Meeting Act and the Open Records Act as a matter of law.

According to the Opinion, the two groups have been formed by a number of boards of county commissioners, for the purpose of providing workers compensation insurance and other property and casualty insurance, for the participating counties.

The Opinion notes, first, that pursuant to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, counties are authorized to insure against liabilities for personal injury or property damage, and may do so by self-insurance, citing 51 O.S.1991, §169(B)(1). Furthermore, pursuant to 51 O.S.1991, §169(C), counties are authorized to self-insure through agreements made pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, codified at 74 O.S. §§1001 et seq. County appropriations may be used to fund the program.

Pursuant to 85 O.S.Supp.1998, §2b, according to the Opinion, counties are also given the option of joining with other counties under the Interlocal Cooperation Act for the purpose of self-insuring for workers compensation. The section requires the counties to pay for the coverage out of the funds of the counties.

The entities at issue in the Opinion are the result of these interlocal cooperation agreements. The Attorney General thus reasoned they were formed pursuant to statutory authorization and have been delegated the task of performing the function of self-insurance that would otherwise be done by the individual counties. Furthermore, the entities receive funding from the county governments.

Thus, the Attorney General held, the Association of County Commissioners Self Insurance Fund and the Association of County Commissioners Self Insurance Group are subject to both the Open Records Act and the Open Meeting Act.

Department of Labor

In A.G. Opinion No. 99-55, issued August 17, 1999, the Attorney General responded to a number of questions relating to the application of the Open Records Act to the Department of Labor.

The first question addressed by the Opinion was whether a "Certificate of Non-Coverage" issued by the Department of Labor pursuant to 40 O.S.Supp.1998, §415.1, is a public record. Under the statute, a Certificate of Non-Coverage may be issued by the Commissioner of Labor, to any person the Commissioner of Labor finds is not required to be covered under a workers' compensation insurance policy.

The Attorney General found that pursuant to the Open Records Act, such a certificate is a record which is presumptively open to the public, citing 51 O.S.Supp.1998, §24A.3. Finding no authority under which the Commissioner is required to keep or may keep the record confidential, the Attorney General held the Certificate of Non-Coverage is not privileged or confidential.

In the Opinion, the Attorney General also reviewed Department of Labor policies concerning information the Department may require a member of the public to provide in order to inspect or copy public records. The Attorney General first noted that under the Open Records Act, a public body is authorized to promulgate rules "establish[ing] reasonable procedures which protect the integrity and organization of its records and to prevent excessive disruptions of its essential functions." 51 O.S. Supp. 1998, §24A.5(5). These rules must be promulgated pursuant to the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. 75 O.S.1991, §§250 - 323, as amended.

The Opinion then notes that under 51 O.S.Supp.1998, §24A.5(3), a public body may, under some circumstances, charge a search fee for records sought solely for a commercial purpose, or if the records search would clearly cause excessive disruption of the public body's essential function. The Attorney General thus found that the Department may, under the Open Records Act, require a record request to be in writing, and may seek information sufficient to determine whether the information sought is for a commercial purpose, such that a search fee may be imposed.

Beyond that, however, the Attorney General ruled that "it is difficult to find additional bases for either the Department of Labor or the Commissioner to require additional information from [records] requestors. In no event," the Opinion continues, could a public body "ever require a requestor to provide the reason for a request." [.]"

The Opinion next addressed whether the Department of Labor may require a member of the public to execute a written contract in order to obtain records of the Department. The Attorney General first observes that since the Department has not promulgated rules to this effect, the Department does not have the authority to require the execution of a written contract.

Further, according to the Opinion, in order to require the execution of a written contract, it would be incumbent upon the Department to demonstrate that pursuant to a specific provision of the Open Records Act such a requirement is reasonable to allow the Department to carry out its duty under the Act to provide public records.

According to the Opinion, Department of Labor policy is to require a written contract when the record request is for other than standard photocopies. The Attorney General held, however, that the Department has no authority to place a burden on a request for a public record merely because the record is not easily photocopied. A requirement for a written contract, then, pursuant to the policy, would be inappropriate even if promulgated as a rule.

Finally, the Attorney General was asked what would constitute a "special" open records request. The Opinion holds that no "special" open records request is contemplated by the Act, and cannot be used to create distinctions in the public's ability to inspect or copy public records.

CRIMINAL PLEADINGS

A.G. Opinion No. 99-58, also issued August 19, 1999, addresses several questions relating to the applicability of the Open Records Act to pleadings in a criminal matter. "Pleadings," as the term is used in the Opinion, relates to the "information," "indictment," or motions, among other documents, which may be filed in a criminal action. "Information" and "indictment" are each defined to be the first pleading filed on the part of the state in a criminal prosecution. 22 O.S. 1991, §388.

The Attorney General concluded that criminal pleadings in the litigation files of a district attorney may be kept confidential, pursuant to 51 O.S.1991, §24A.12, which authorizes a district attorney to keep litigation files and investigatory reports confidential. However, no general privilege of confidentiality exists for an office of a court clerk. Thus, once a district attorney's records are filed with the court clerk, they ordinarily must be made available for public inspection and copying unless they have been "sealed" by the district court or are otherwise protected by a specific privilege of confidentiality, such as a grand jury indictment. See 22 O.S. 1991, §385.

Attorney General Opinion No. 99-58 also addressed how long a court clerk or district attorney may "withhold" a public record before the Open Records Act is violated. The Attorney General notes that there is no provision in the Act for a public body to "withhold" records for any amount of time, however, small. The duty to provide prompt and reasonable access is complied with only when a public body properly attends to its duty to provide a record. How long that time is, the Opinion states, is a question of fact outside the scope of an Attorney General Opinion.